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Response

No Explanation Required? A Reply to
Jeffrey Bellin’s eHearsay
Colin Miller

†

You see why I tell you I ain’t want to be no damn juror. Some dude
just come by my house and tell me he going pay me money to say not
guilty. Now I don’t know what to do, because if I tell the judge they’re
going to know it’s me.
I know, right. Now I scared because I don’t want them to do any1
thing to me or [my daughter][. . .]***

The above were text messages sent by a juror to her sister
after Ikim Blackett allegedly threatened and then tried to bribe
her in an attempt to convince her to find one of several defend2
ants “not guilty” of various drug crimes. At Blackett’s ensuing
trial for jury bribery, the juror testified that, while she was on
her front porch, Blackett approached her and mentioned the
3
word “nitroglycerin.” The juror then “asked Blackett what ‘ni4
troglycerin’ meant and he responded ‘not guilty.’” When this
threat fell on deaf ears, Blackett offered the juror $1,500 in ex5
change for her vote. After again declining, the juror went to
6
her bedroom and sent the above text messages.
Should the text messages have been admissible because
the juror took the witness stand and testified at trial? If the juror were “unavailable” at trial, should the text messages have
7
been admissible? According to Professor Jeffrey Bellin’s arti† Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; Blog
Editor, EvidenceProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/.
Copyright © 2013 by Colin Miller.
1. Brief for the Appellee, United States v. Blackett, 481 Fed. App’x. 741
(3d Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-1556), 2012 WL 248361, at *3 (alteration in original).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (describing circumstances under which “[a]
declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness”).
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cle, eHearsay, the answer to both questions is “yes” as he crafts
hearsay rules that cover both situations. This Response Piece
agrees with Professor Bellin on the first question but disagrees
with him on the second.
I. PRIOR WITNESS STATEMENTS UNDER FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(D)(1) AND PROPOSED RULE
801(D)(1)(D)
A. THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) indicates:
“Hearsay” means a statement that:
the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or
hearing; and
a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
8
the statement.

In turn, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 deems hearsay inadmissible in the absence of an exception, exclusion, or federal
9
statute. Rule 802 deems hearsay evidence presumptively inadmissible both because such evidence is unreliable and because the jury has an inability to assess that unreliability at
trial. As the Supreme Court explained in Williamson v. United
States, Rule 802:
is premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to
particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived the events which he relates; he might have faulty memory;
his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by the listener. And the ways in which these dangers are minimized for incourt statements—the oath, the witness’ awareness of the gravity of
the proceedings, the jury’s ability to observe the witness’ demeanor,
and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine—
10
are generally absent for things said out of court.

B. THE RULE 803 AND 804 EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST
HEARSAY
Meanwhile, Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 create
hearsay exceptions for statements made under circumstances
that allow them to “possess circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the de8. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
9. FED. R. EVID. 802. Federal Rule of Evidence 802 states, “Hearsay is
not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”
10. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994).
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11

clarant in person at the trial.” In other words, a statement
qualifying under a Rule 803 or 804 exception speaks for itself,
meaning that the declarant need not take the witness stand
and submit himself to the crucible of cross-examination con12
cerning the statement. Indeed, for a statement to qualify for
admission under Rule 804, the declarant has to be “unavaila13
ble” at trial while Rule 803 statements are admissible “re14
gardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.”
Statements qualifying for admission under hearsay exceptions are thought to be sufficiently trustworthy for an amalgam
of defensible and questionable reasons. A dying declaration un15
der Rule 804(b)(2) is admissible because it is thought that a
16
person does not want to die with a lie on his lips. A statement
made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment under Rule
17
803(4) is believed to be truthful under the “selfish motive”
theory that a patient fears that a lie to a doctor could lead to
18
misdiagnosis and/or mistreatment. And a business record
11. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
12. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 200 (1987) (“This
concern is sometimes satisfied when evidence is admitted under a hearsay exception, even where no cross-examination of the declarant occurs at trial.”). If
the statement, however, is “testimonial,” the declarant would need to submit
himself to cross-examination for the statement to comport with the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
13. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
14. FED. R. EVID. 803; see FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note
(“Rule 803 . . . is based upon the assumption that a hearsay statement falling
within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion
that whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor
in determining admissibility.”).
15. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). Rule 804(b)(2) provides an exception to the
rule against hearsay: “In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent,
made about its cause or circumstances.”
16. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). There are actually two
reasons why dying declarations are thought to be reliable. As noted by the Supreme Court of Alaska, “[t]wo basic reasons have been advanced for admission
of such testimony: necessity, because of the witness’ death, and a belief that
the approach of death removes ordinary motives to misstate.” Johnson v.
State, 579 P.2d 20, 24 (Alaska 1978).
17. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides an
exception to the rule against hearsay for “[a] statement that: (A) is made for—
and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.”
18. See, e.g., Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 562 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“This exception to the hearsay rule is premised on the notion that a declarant
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19

qualifying for admission under Rule 803(6) is considered reliable because a company has an incentive to keep accurate records to ensure that it stays in the black or is aware when it dips
20
into the red.
C. RULE 801(D)(2) AND STATEMENTS MADE BY OR ON BEHALF OF
A PARTY
Unlike Rules 803 and 804, Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2) defines five statements as nonhearsay under the assumption that the speaker (or the party to whom the statement
is attributed) can and, in most cases, will testify at trial. Rule
801(d)(2) defines a statement as nonhearsay if:
The statement is offered against an opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;

seeking treatment ‘has a selfish motive to be truthful’ because ‘the effectiveness of medical treatment depends upon the accuracy of the information provided.’”).
19. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides an
exception to the rule against hearsay for:
[a] record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a
business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another
qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12)
or with a statute permitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
20. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1175 (2011) (“Hearsay law
exempts business records, for example, because businesses have a financial
incentive to keep reliable records.”). Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides
a similar hearsay exception for:
[a] record or statement of a public office if:
(A) it sets out:
(i) the office’s activities;
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement
personnel; or
(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and
(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate
a lack of trustworthiness.
The “[j]ustification for the exception is the assumption that a public official
will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember details independently of the record.” FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s
note.
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(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a
statement on the subject;
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the
scope of that relationship and while it existed; or
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance
21
of the conspiracy.

Under Rule 801(d)(2), then, a statement is not hearsay if
(1) it is adopted by a party—a criminal defendant, civil defendant, or civil plaintiff—or made by a party or the party’s
authorizee (e.g., publicist or press secretary), employee, or coconspirator; and (2) it is offered against the party.
Notably, “[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness is required in
22
the case of” a Rule 801(d)(2) statement. Instead, the point is
that “[t]here is less concern about trustworthiness, especially in
civil cases, because the party against whom the statements are
offered generally can take the stand and explain, deny, or rebut
23
the statements.” Civil plaintiffs and defendants likely have to
testify at trial while criminal defendants can choose whether to
testify or exercise their Fifth Amendment privilege against self24
incrimination. Rule 801(d)(2) statements are thus admissible
“based . . . upon the identity of the speaker” rather than the
trustworthiness of the statement, with a party not being able to
“complain about the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine
25
himself.”
D. PRIOR WITNESS STATEMENTS UNDER RULE 801(D)(1)
While Rule 801(d)(1) also defines certain statements as
nonhearsay, it does not do so based upon the identity of the
speaker. Rule 801(d)(1) defines a statement as nonhearsay if:
The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a
prior statement, and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given un21. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
22. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note.
23. Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1128 (7th Cir. 2013).
24. See U.S. Const. amend V.
25. Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., 205 P.3d 844, 860 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 244 P.3d 343 (N.M. 2010). The same logic applies to
statements by authorizees, employees and co-conspirators under Federal
Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E). As the Supreme Court noted in
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 190 (1987), “it was thought that a
party could not complain of the deprivation of the right to cross-examine himself (or another authorized to speak for him) or to advocate his own, or his
agents, untrustworthiness.”
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der penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a
deposition;
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut
an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it
or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or
26
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.

A statement qualifying for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)
can be made by a party or a party’s representative, but it can
also be made by many other declarants, including alleged victims and innocent bystanders. Therefore, unlike Rule 801(d)(2),
Rule 801(d)(1) explicitly requires that the declarant testify at
27
trial for his prior statement to be admissible.
Indeed, the requirement that the declarant testify at trial
and be “subject to cross-examination about [the] prior state28
ment” is fundamental to the efficacy of Rule 801(d)(1). The
Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 801 indicates that prior
witness statements are generally deemed hearsay but then
29
points out the three exclusions created Rules 801(d)(1)(A)-(C).
The Advisory Committee did not try to argue that statements
falling under the auspices of Rules 801(d)(1)(A), (B), or (C) have
sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; instead, the Committee acknowledges that the judgment concern30
ing their classification “is one more of experience than logic.”
Accordingly, Rule 801(d)(1) “requires in each instance, as a
general safeguard, that the declarant actually testify as a wit31
ness.”
Statements qualifying for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)
are thus admissible not because they are thought to be sufficiently reliable when made. Nor are they admissible solely because the declarant testifies at trial; declarant testimony is insufficient to allow for the admission of the vast majority of prior
witness statements. Instead, Rule 801(d)(1) statements are
admissible because they are (1) likely more reliable than the
declarant’s testimony at trial; and (2) relevant both to prove the
truth of the matter asserted and to impeach and/or bolster the
credibility of a declarant who has testified at trial.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
See id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s notes.
Id.
Id.
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1. Prior Inconsistent Statements Under Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
As noted, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) deems a witness’s prior inconsistent statement to be nonhearsay if that prior statement “was
32
given under penalty of perjury.” Certainly, the fact that a
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) statement is given under oath makes it more
reliable than the run-of-the-mill hearsay statement. Moreover,
this “penalty of perjury” requirement distinguishes a Rule
801(d)(1)(A) statement from a prior inconsistent statement not
given under oath; such a statement is hearsay and admissible
under Federal Rule 613 only to impeach the witness and not to
33
prove the truth of the matter asserted. But the mere fact that
the prior statement was given subject to the penalty of perjury
would not ordinarily satisfy hearsay concerns.
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) sets forth a hearsay exception for former testimony by an unavailable declarant and
defines former testimony as:
Testimony that:
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition,
whether given during the current proceeding or a different one; and
(B) is now offered against a party who had—or, in a civil case, whose
predecessor in interest had—an opportunity and similar motive to de34
velop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.
32. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 613. Rule 613 states as follows:
(a) Showing or Disclosing the Statement During Examination. When
examining a witness about the witness’s prior statement, a party
need not show it or disclose its contents to the witness. But the party
must, on request, show it or disclose its contents to an adverse party’s
attorney.
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement. Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if
the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement
and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness
about it, or if justice so requires. This subdivision (b) does not apply to
an opposing party’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2).
As the First Circuit noted in United States v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885, 888 (1st
Cir. 1982), a prior inconsistent statement admitted under Rule 613 “is admitted not for the truth of the matter asserted in the prior statement but to impeach the credibility of the witness.” Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit pointed
out in United States v. Day, 789 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986), that, “[i]n
seeking to limit the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements for substantive purposes, Congress determined that statements given under oath at a
‘formal proceeding’ were inherently more reliable than statements given in the
absence of such formalities.”
34. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Burbank, No. 885634, 1990 WL 86147, at *2 (4th Cir. June 12, 1990) (“Under 804(b)(1), former
testimony is admissible in criminal cases only when the party against whom
the testimony is offered had an opportunity to cross-examine or otherwise de-

2013]

NO EXPLANATION REQUIRED?

41

Therefore, for a declarant’s former testimony to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1), it is not enough that the testimony
was given under oath and that some party had the opportunity
to question the declarant; instead, the party against whom that
testimony is later offered (or its civil predecessor) must have
35
had that opportunity. Moreover, the opportunity, alone, is insufficient; the opposing party must also have had a similar motive to develop the declarant’s testimony at the prior trial, hear36
ing, or deposition.
No such requirement exists under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Instead, the Rule allows for the admission of prior inconsistent
statements given under oath regardless of whether the opposing party had any opportunity to question the declarant when
37
the declarant made those prior statements. Therefore, Rule
801(d)(1)(A) statements are not as reliable as Rule 804(b)(1)
statements, but they are admissible for the two reasons applicable to all three of the Rule 801(d)(1) exclusions.
First, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) statements are likely more reliable
than the declarant’s testimony at trial. According to the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 801, “[i]n many cases, the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony
of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time
to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influ38
enced by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation.”
Moreover, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) was based in large part on “concern about witness intimidation—i.e., witnesses who could be
intimidated or were otherwise vulnerable to pressure with the
result that their prior statements were a more reliable guide to
39
the fact finder than their testimony in the courtroom.”
velop the witness's testimony.”).
35. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380,
385 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In determining whether a party had such a motive, a
court must evaluate not only the similarity of the issues, but also the purpose
for which the testimony is given.”).
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., People v. Farguharson, 731 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Mich. Ct. App.
2007) (“This Court held that the witnesses’ grand jury testimony was properly
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement under MRE 801(d)(1)(A), but would
have been inadmissible under MRE 804(b)(1) because ‘defendant had no ‘opportunity . . . to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination’
in front of the grand jury.’”).
38. Fed. R. Evid 801 advisory committee’s note (quoting Comment, California Evidence Code §1235).
39. Conley v. N.L.R.B., 520 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Conley
Trucking, 349 NLRB 308 (2007)).
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Second, prior inconsistent statements are relevant both to
prove the truth of the matter asserted and to impeach the credibility of a declarant who has testified at trial. This relevance is
ensured by the fact that, under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), “[t]he declarant is in court and may be examined and cross-examined in re40
gard to his statements and their subject matter.” Assume that
William testifies at Dan’s trial for murdering Vince: “I saw Dan
fire the fatal shot that killed Vince.” As a result, the jury finds
Dan guilty of the murder, and the prosecution later charges
Dan’s co-conspirator, Carl, with Vince’s murder. The prosecution again calls William, who now testifies, “I saw Carl fire the
fatal bullet that killed Vince.” Under Rule 801(1)(A), the defense can now introduce William’s prior inconsistent statement
for two purposes.
First, it can use the statement to impeach William, i.e., to
call into question his credibility based upon the contradiction
between his two statements. The most classic example of such
impeachment is the question, “‘Were you lying then or are you
41
lying now?’” “Forcing a witness to admit to the jury that he is
42
a liar is the Holy Grail of cross-examination,” the assumption
43
being that no “juror would give credence to any statement of”
the witness caught in such a contradiction. Second, because the
prior inconsistent statement is not hearsay, it can be offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that it was indeed
44
Dan, and not Carl, who fired the fatal bullet.
2. Prior Consistent Statements Under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
Like prior inconsistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(A),
prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are insufficiently reliable when originally uttered to be admissible. Returning to the hypothetical in which Dan is on trial for Vince’s
murder, assume again that William testifies, “I saw Dan fire
the fatal shot that killed Vince.” Assume that two days after
the shooting and six months before trial, William had told his
friend, Fred, “I saw Dan fire the fatal shot that killed Vince.” If
40. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note.
41. Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010).
42. Id.
43. Murdoch v. Castro, 489 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc,
609 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Dietrich, 854 F.2d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“If a prior inconsistent statement meets the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
it may be admitted as substantive evidence to establish the truth of the matter
asserted.”).

2013]

NO EXPLANATION REQUIRED?

43

the defense does not claim that William’s trial testimony was a
recent fabrication or that it resulted from a recent improper influence or motive, William’s statement to Fred would be inadmissible hearsay that fails to qualify for admission under a
hearsay exception or exclusion.
Assume, however, that the defense expressly or impliedly
claims that William’s trial testimony against Dan is a recent
fabrication that he rendered in exchange for a favorable plea
bargain offered to him by the prosecution a few weeks before
trial. In this case, the elements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) have been
satisfied, and the prosecution can now introduce William’s prior
consistent statement to Fred because it preceded the improper
influence or motive—the plea deal—that allegedly caused William to fabricate his trial testimony.
The allegation of recent fabrication by the defense does not
make William’s statement to Fred any more trustworthy, but it
does make that prior statement more reliable than William’s
testimony at trial, which, in effect, has been labeled the fruit of
the poisonous tree. First, “the fact that a witness made a prior
consistent statement closer in time to the event can support
relevant inferences that the testimony is unlikely to be the
45
product of memory problems.” Second, “statements made before a reason to distort the truth arose would be more reliable
46
than those made after such a motive arose.” Of course, this
means that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) applies only to consistent statements made before the improper motive arose because state47
ments made after the motive arose would be no more reliable.
As with prior inconsistent statements, prior consistent
statements are relevant for dual purposes. While a party introduces a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a witness, a
party uses a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate or bolster the credibility of a witness who has been charged with fab45. David M. Paciocco, The Perils and Potential of Prior Consistent Statements: Let's Get It Right, 17 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 181, 214 (2013). Cf.
United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Even where the
suggestion of contradiction is only imputation of an inaccurate memory, a prior consistent statement is admissible to rebut the inference.”).
46. Robert P. Burns, Foreword: Bright Lines and Hard Edges: Anatomy of
a Criminal Evidence Decision, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 843, 870 (1995).
47. See generally Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (“The
Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive.”).

44

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[98:34

48

ricating his trial testimony. Moreover, because the prior consistent statement is nonhearsay and not tainted by any recent
improper influence or motive, it is also admissible to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Dan in fact fired the fatal
49
shot that killed Vince.
3. Prior Statements of Identification Under Rule 801(d)(1)(C)
Both Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are subject to
Rule 801(d)(1)’s requirement that the declarant testify at trial,
but this requirement is surplusage. A statement can be a prior
inconsistent or consistent statement only if it is inconsistent or
consistent with the declarant’s testimony at trial, which means,
of course, that the declarant has to testify for either of these
rules to apply. The same is not true of Rule 801(d)(1)(C), which
covers prior statements of identification and helps to crystallize
the principles unifying the three exclusions contained in Rule
801(d)(1).
Returning again to the hypothetical in which Dan is on trial for Vince’s murder, William might pick Dan out of a lineup
or pick his picture out of a photo array as the person whom he
saw shoot Vince. Like prior inconsistent and consistent statements, such eyewitness identifications are insufficiently reliable when rendered to be admissible. Both “statistical and psychological data has shown that eyewitness identifications,
whether lineup or show-up confrontations, produce highly un50
reliable evidence and frequently are inaccurate.” Indeed, seventy-five percent of convictions overturned due to DNA evidence involved eyewitness misidentifications, and reviews of
actual police records in four studies revealed that “about onethird of eyewitnesses who made identifications in police inves51
tigations wrongly identified a known innocent stand-in.”
48. See, e.g., United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1242 n.8 (7th Cir.
1996) (“FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) contains the bolstering/rehabilitation rule
by defining as nonhearsay only those prior consistent statements that are offered ‘to rebut an express or implied charge’ against a witness of ‘recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.’”).
49. See, e.g., Ross v. Saint Augustine’s Coll., 103 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir.
1996) (“Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), a prior out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted is admissible . . . .”)
50. Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical DecisionMaking in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 GONZ. L. REV.
319, 331 (2012).
51. The Honorable Stuart Rabner, Evaluating Eyewitness Identification
Evidence in the 21st Century, 87 N.YU. L. REV. 1249, 1263 (2012).
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It is thus not the independent reliability of eyewitness
identifications that makes them admissible; instead, such pretrial identifications are admissible because they are thought to
be more reliable than in-court identifications. In essence, “outof-court identifications made shortly after the crime a[re] of far
greater probative value than are in-court ones where the defendant can easily be picked out (he sits at defense counsel’s
table) and where the witness testifies months or years after the
52
crime.”
This view of the relative reliability of pre-trial and in-court
identifications is corroborated by Rule 801(d)(1)’s requirement
that the declarant must testify for a Rule 801(d)(1)(C) identification to be admissible. If William picked Dan out of a lineup
and did not testify at trial, his pre-trial identification would not
53
be admissible. It is only the eyewitness’ testimony at trial that
justifies the admission of his pre-trial identification so that the
jury can compare or contrast the two.
Whenever a party admits a pre-trial statement to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement, testimony or evidence concerning the statement “presents issues of ambiguity,
54
insincerity, erroneous memory, and faulty perception.” When
the declarant who made such a statement does not testify, “all
of these concerns will come to fruition because the jury will not
55
have an opportunity to evaluate the declarant.” This reasoning explains why declarants are required to testify under Rule
801(d)(1) generally and under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) specifically:
[R]ule 801(d)(1)(C)’s requirement that the declarant testify at trial
and be subject to cross-examination prevents these traditional hearsay concerns from creating an impediment and affords the jury the
opportunity to reach its own determination about a declarant’s credi-

52. Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST., Summer
2005, at 39, 50; see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988)
(“The premise for Rule 801(d)(1)(C) was that, given adequate safeguards
against suggestiveness, out-of-court identifications were generally preferable
to courtroom identifications.”).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1210 n.19 (11 Cir.
2005) (“Nor is it classified as a non-hearsay statement of identification under
Rule 801(d)(1)(C), because Jetier did not testify at the trial and was not subject to cross-examination concerning that statement.”).
54. Gilbert M. Rein, Note, “That’s the Guy!”: Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(C) and Out-of-Court Statements of Identification, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1539, 1563 (2013).
55. Id.
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bility and the circumstances in which the statement in issue was
56
made.

The requirement that the eyewitness testify at trial also
explains why pre-trial identifications admitted under Rule
801(d)(1)(C) have dual relevance. Assume that William picked
Dan out of a pre-trial lineup and then pointed to Dan at the defense table at trial when asked who murdered Vince. Thereafter, the prosecution could admit William’s pre-trial identification under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) both to bolster the credibility of
William’s in-court identification and to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in his pre-trial identification: that Dan was the
57
murderer.
Alternatively, assume that William picked someone other
than Dan out of a pre-trial lineup but then pointed to Dan at
the defense table at trial when asked who murdered Vince. In
this case, the defense could admit the pre-trial identification
under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) both to impeach the credibility of William’s in-court identification and to prove the truth of the matter asserted in his pre-trial identification: that someone other
58
than Dan was the murderer.
E. THE FIT BETWEEN PROPOSED RULE 801(D)(1)(D) AND THE
RULE 801(D)(1) RATIONALES
In his article, eHearsay, Professor Jeffrey Bellin proposes a
fourth exclusion to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). Under
Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D):
A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: (1)
The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a
prior statement, and the statement . . . (D) would qualify as a Recorded Statement of Recent Perception under Rule 804(b)(5) if the declar59
ant were unavailable.

56. Id.
57. See, e.g., State v. Joyner, 107 So.3d 675, 691 (La. Ct. App. 2012)
(“Lieutenant Italiano’s testimony was independently admissible as
nonhearsay, for the truth of the matter of asserted, under La. C.E. art.
801(D)(1)(c).”).
58. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 687 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Al. Crim. App. 1996)
(“An identification statement could be admissible to show lack of credibility if
an in-court identification is inconsistent with an out-of-court one.”); see also
State v. Wright, 730 So.2d 485, 489 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“Further, multiple
federal circuits have held that previous identification testimony admitted into
evidence pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) is available not simply for impeachment, but as substantive evidence.”).
59. Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 36.
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This Proposed Rule would be a good fit with the rest of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). Initially, as with statements admissible under the three existing Rule 801(d)(1) exclusions, eHearsay statements would not be admissible under
Rule 801(d)(1)(D) based upon their independent reliability
when they were made. This conclusion is proven by the fact
that Professor Bellin’s exclusion covers only “recorded commu60
nication.” If William orally tells his friend, Fred, “I saw Dan
shoot Vince two days ago,” Professor Bellin would specifically
deem that statement inadmissible under his new eHearsay exclusion while a text message or e-mail containing the same content and written at the same time would be admissible under
61
the exclusion. Obviously, at the time that William composed
such a text message or e-mail, it would be no more reliable than
his oral statement to Fred, so it must be something other than
the independent reliability of the recorded communication that
makes it admissible.
This takes us to another similarity between proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(D) and the three existing Rule 801(d) exclusions: the
admissibility of eHearsay is premised on it likely being more
reliable than the declarant’s testimony at trial. Professor
Bellin’s proposed eHearsay exclusion is based upon the rejected
“Statement of Recent Perception” hearsay exception, which requires statements to be made somewhat soon after the declar62
ant perceives an event or condition. The fact that such statements are made much nearer to the event or condition than the
declarant’s testimony at trial makes them less susceptible to
inaccuracy due to memory loss and more likely to be accurate,
which, as noted, is also part of the explanation for the admissibility of statements under the three existing Rule 801(d)(1) ex63
clusions.
Moreover, statements admitted under Professor Bellin’s
eHearsay exclusion would likely be more sincere than testimony rendered at trial. In his article, Professor Bellin indicates
that his exclusion would not cover “a statement made in contemplation of litigation or to a person who is investigating, liti64
gating, or settling a potential or existing claim.” As noted, this
explanation is similar to the explanations supporting the ad60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 38.
Id. at 38–41.
Id. at 28.
See supra notes 38–39, 46, 52 and accompanying text.
Bellin, supra note 59, at 36.
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mission of statements under the three existing Rule 801(d)(1)
exclusions.
Prior inconsistent statements admitted under Rule
801(d)(1)(A) are seemingly “less likely [than trial testimony] to
be influenced by the controversy that gave rise to the litiga65
tion.” The entire point of the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) exclusion is
that the prior consistent statement was not influenced by the
improper influences and motives that often accompany testi66
mony at trial. And the basis for admitting prior statements of
identification under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is the scripted nature of
the in-court identification, in which the eyewitness knows that
his role is to point to the accused at the defense table when
67
asked who committed the crime charged.
Of course, both of these rationales apply equally to nonrecorded statements of recent perception, which Professor
Bellin deems inadmissible under his eHearsay exclusion. It is
thus the recording of eHearsay that makes it admissible because, as Professor Bellin notes, “[w]hen an in-court witness relates another person’s hearsay statement, a danger arises that
the in-court witness’s testimony is unreliable. The testifying
witness may mishear, misremember, miscommunicate, or
(worst of all) manufacture the out-of-court speaker’s state68
ment.”
This recording requirement places proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(D) on similar footing with Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and (C).
One major reason Rule 801(d)(1)(A) categorizes as nonhearsay
only prior inconsistent statements that were given at a trial,
hearing, or deposition is that those statements were recorded
69
and can be repeated verbatim at trial. Similarly, under Rule
801(d)(1)(C), jurors are not usually forced to rely upon a police
officer’s account of a pre-trial eyewitness identification because
70
“lineups can be and often are photographically recorded.”
65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
68. Bellin, supra note 59, at 38.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1539 (11th Cir. 1992)
(“The court permitted Jacoby to impeach Merrill by reading verbatim the
transcript of Merrill's grand jury testimony. Jacoby thus was able to develop
fully before the jury the alleged inconsistencies between the witness' trial and
grand jury testimony.”).
70. United States v. Gallo-Moreno, 584 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir. 2009). But
see Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 353 (2012) (“It may be
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Furthermore, as with Rule 801(d)(1)(C) and the other Rule
801(d)(1) exclusions, an essential component of Proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(D) is the declarant’s testimony at trial. As noted, the
lynchpin of Rule 801(d)(1) is the requirement that the declarant
testify at trial because, without the opportunity for crossexamination, the jury lacks the opportunity “to reach its own
determination about a declarant’s credibility and the circum71
stances in which the statement in issue was made.” For reasons that will be described in Section III, it makes even more
sense to require the declarant of eHearsay to testify at trial and
be subjected to cross-examination.
Finally, as with evidence admitted under the other hearsay
exclusions contained in Rule 801(d)(1), evidence admitted pursuant to Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) would serve twin purposes.
Assume that William sends his friend, Fred, a text message
that says, “OMG! Dan killed Vince two days ago.” If William
testifies at trial that he saw Dan kill Vince, his text message
would be admissible under Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) for two
purposes. First, the prosecution could use the text message to
bolster the credibility of William based upon the consistency
between his two statements. Basically, this would be similar to
a prior consistent statement but with the recording of the prior
statement obviating the need for the opposing party to claim
that the declarant’s trial testimony was a recent fabrication.
Second, the text message would be admissible to prove the
truth of the matter asserted: that Dan in fact did kill Vince.
Assume instead that William sends his friend, Fred, a text
message that says, “OMG! Carl killed Vince two days ago.” If
William testifies at trial that he saw Dan kill Vince, the text
message would also be admissible for dual purposes. First, the
prosecution could use the text message to impeach William’s
credibility based upon the inconsistency between the two
statements. Basically, this would be similar to impeachment
through a prior inconsistent statement or a prior statement of
identification that contradicts the declarant’s in-court identification. Second, the text message would be admissible to prove
the truth of the matter asserted: that it was in fact Carl who
killed Vince.
common to preserve a photograph of a lineup or the photo array used in a case,
but interviews with eyewitnesses have generally not been well documented
and certainly have not been electronically recorded. Some jurisdictions have
made great strides in this area, but most have not.”).
71. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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F. PROPOSED RULE 801(D)(1)(D) AS AN EXTENSION OF RULE
803(5)
1. Why Rule 803(5) Should Be Moved to Rule 801(d)(1)
Another reason to include Professor Bellin’s eHearsay exclusion in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) is the similarity
between Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(D) and
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5). At first, this statement might
appear odd because Rule 803(5) is not part of Rule 801(d)(1).
This article contends, however, that Rule 803(5) should be a
part of Rule 801(d)(1) and that its current location in the Rules
is a mere historical relic.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) creates an exception to the
rule against hearsay for:
A record that:
(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall
well enough to testify fully and accurately;
(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
the witness’s memory; and
(C) accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.
If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received
72
as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.

Because of its placement in Federal Rule of Evidence 803,
this “recorded recollection” exception is supposed to apply “re73
gardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.”
The recorded recollection exception thus seems like an odd fit
with Federal Rule of Evidence 803 because it envisions a witness both being available and testifying at trial, albeit without
74
a complete enough memory to testify fully and accurately. It is
the incomplete memory of the witness that confused the issue
of where to place the recorded recollection rule.
As noted, hearsay is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804 only if the hearsay declarant is deemed “unavailable”
72. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
73. FED. R. EVID. 803.
74. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A). See United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d
1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[S]ince the hearsay declarant in this case was
available for cross-examination, and since the referral report would otherwise
qualify as a recorded recollection, we find no reversible error in the admission
of the report.”); Smith v. State, 880 So.2d 730, 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(“In order for a memorandum or record to qualify as recorded recollection, the
witness must testify that he made an accurate record of the fact or event or
that he is confident that the facts would not have been written unless they
were true.”).
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75

under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a). One way to prove that
a declarant is “unavailable” is with the declarant’s own testimony that he or she cannot “remember[] the subject matter,”
76
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). The drafters
of the recorded recollection exception were thus presented with
three placement options:
Locating the exception [in Rule 803] of the rules [wa]s a matter of
choice. There were two other possibilities. The first was to regard the
statement as one of the group of prior statements of a testifying witness which are excluded entirely from the category of hearsay by Rule
801(d)(1). That category, however, requires that declarant be “subject
to cross-examination,” as to which the impaired memory aspect of the
exception raises doubts. The other possibility was to include the exception among those covered by Rule 804. Since unavailability is required by that rule and lack of memory is listed as a species of unavailability by the definition of the term in Rule 804(a)(3), that
treatment at first impression would seem appropriate. The fact is,
however, that the unavailability requirement of the exception is of a
limited and peculiar nature. Accordingly, the exception is located at
this point rather than in the context of a rule where unavailability is
77
conceived of more broadly.

Basically, the drafters thought that placing the recorded
recollection exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803 was the
least of three evils. Placing it in Federal Rule of Evidence 804
did not quite make sense because the declarant’s unavailability
under the recorded recollection exception was “of a limited and
78
peculiar nature.” The exception requires that the declarant
have enough memory of an event to be able to testify that his
recorded recollection accurately reflects his once-existing
knowledge of the event but not enough memory to testify fully
79
and accurately about the event. Under Rule 803(5), the declarant must thus have “impaired memory,” which also caused
the drafters of the recorded recollection rule not to place it in
Rule 801(d)(1) for fear that a declarant with limited memory
might not be deemed “subject to cross-examination” as is re80
quired under the Rule.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
76. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
77. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 397 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1986)
(“[I]f the witness remembers an incident—such as an accident—but has forgotten a detail—was the light red or green—the contents of his previous statement relating to traffic signals should be admitted, provided the other tests of
Rule 803(5) are met.” (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE ¶ 803(5)[01], at 159-60 (1985))).
80. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
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That said, the recorded recollection exception is an uncomfortable fit in Federal Rule of Evidence 803. It seems inaccurate
to say, as Rule 803 does, that a recorded recollection is admissible “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a wit81
ness.” Instead, as the Advisory Committee noted, the declarant of a recorded recollection must suffer from unavailability
“of a limited and peculiar nature,” which, by implication, means
that he must also be “available” to some degree. Therefore, rather than the availability of a Rule 803(5) declarant being unimportant, which is the case for all of the other Rule 803 exceptions, it is of the utmost importance.
While the recorded recollection rule seems out of place in
Rule 803, Rule 801(d)(1) would now fit the rule like a glove giv82
en the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Owens. In
Owens, “John Foster, a correctional counselor at the federal
prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked and brutally beaten
83
with a metal pipe.” Owens thereafter identified the defendant
84
as his assailant during a photo array. At the defendant’s trial,
Foster testified to severe memory loss such that he could not
remember seeing his assailant and could not recall whether
any people who visited him at the hospital suggested that the
85
defendant was his assailant. The court thereafter permitted
the prosecution to introduce Foster’s identification of the defendant during the photo array pursuant to Federal Rule of Ev86
idence 801(d)(1)(C).
After he was convicted, the defendant appealed, claiming,
inter alia, that Foster’s memory loss meant that he was not
“subject to cross-examination,” as is required by Federal Rule of
87
Evidence 801(d)(1). The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding:
It seems to us that the more natural reading of “subject to crossexamination concerning the statement” includes what was available
here. Ordinarily a witness is regarded as “subject to crossexamination” when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the process to
such a degree that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of
the Rule no longer exists. But that effect is not produced by the wit81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

FED. R. EVID. 803.
484 U.S. 554 (1988).
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 561.
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ness’ assertion of memory loss—which, as discussed earlier, is often
the very result sought to be produced by cross-examination, and can
be effective in destroying the force of the prior statement. Rule
801(d)(1)(C), which specifies that the cross-examination need only
88
“concer[n] the statement,” does not on its face require more.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that this reading of Rule 801(d)(1) created a “substantive
inconsistency” with Rule 804(a)(3), finding instead that there
89
was a mere “semantic oddity” or “verbal curiosity.” According
to the Court, it would be nonsensical to deem an “unavailable”
declarant under Rule 804(a)(3) not “subject to crossexamination” under Rule 801(d)(1) because that would mean
that such a declarant could avoid the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement “by simply asserting lack of memory of
90
the facts to which the prior testimony related.” Therefore, the
Court concluded that a witness can be:
“subject to cross-examination” under Rule 801 while at the same time
“unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(3). Quite obviously, the two characterizations are made for two entirely different purposes and there is
91
no requirement or expectation that they should coincide.

Accordingly, the problem flagged in the Advisory Committee’s Note no longer exists. If a declarant takes the witness
stand and admits that he has the impaired memory necessary
for application of the recorded recollection exception, he is still
“subject to cross-examination” by virtue of taking the witness
92
stand. Therefore, what is currently Federal Rule of Evidence
803(5) could be moved to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1).
Moreover, this recorded recollection rule should be moved
to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). Like the statements admitted under the current exclusions under Rule 801(d)(1), recorded recollections are admissible not because they were inherently reliable when made, but instead because they are more
reliable than the declarant’s trial testimony. If William sees
Dan shoot Vince and sends a text message to his friend, Fred,
to that effect two days later, that text message would not be
admissible at trial if William takes the witness stand at Dan’s
88. Id. at 561–62.
89. Id. at 563.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 563–64.
92. See id.; see also United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1134
n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Owens bolsters its conclusion that the legitimately forgetful witness is subject to cross-examination for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(C)
by contrasting that evidentiary provision with the definition of ‘unavailability
as a witness’ in Rule 804(a).”).
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murder trial and testifies that he has “total recall” of the shooting. Instead, for a recorded recollection such as the text message to be admissible as a recorded recollection, the declarant
must be unable to testify fully and accurately because of im93
paired memory. Thus, recorded recollections are admissible
because they are more reliable than the declarant’s trial testimony, the same analysis that applies to prior inconsistent
statements, prior consistent statements, and prior statements
94
of identification. This reliability is bolstered by the fact that,
95
as with all Rule 801(d)(1) statements, recorded recollections
are “made closer in time to when the underlying events happened than a description produced in court at the time of the
96
trial.”
Also, like current Rule 801(d)(1) statements, recorded recollections are admissible for twin purposes. First, they are admissible to corroborate the witness’ testimony and thus bolster
97
his credibility. Recall the Blackett case from the introduction.
In that case, the defendant allegedly threatened a juror. At trial, the juror testified regarding the encounter but also claimed
98
that she suffered from an impaired memory. As a result, pursuant to Rule 803(5), the court allowed the prosecution to introduce the text messages that the juror sent soon after the encounter, with “the text message[s] corroborat[ing] [the juror]’s
99
testimony and establish[ing] her credibility . . . .” Second, recorded recollections are also admissible to prove the truth of the
matter asserted: that the defendant in fact threatened the juror
100
in the Blackett case.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A).
See supra notes 38–39, 46, 52 and accompanying text.
See id.
Kim Lane Scheppele, The Ground-Zero Theory of Evidence, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 321, 329 (1998).
97. See United States v. Blackett, 481 Fed.App’x. 741 (3d Cir. 2012).
98. See id. As Professor Bellin notes in his article, the juror merely testified that that she did not remember the content of the text message while she
appeared to have good recall of Blackett’s intimidation. See Bellin, supra note
59, at 38. Therefore, it was questionable whether the text messages qualified
as recorded recollections, a question that the Third Circuit did not resolve,
finding that any possible error was harmless. See id.; see also Colin Miller, Q:
What Does Nitroglycerin Mean? A: Not Guilty; 3rd Circuit Fails To Decide
Whether Text Message Was Recorded Recollection, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (June
4, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/06/8035-text-us-v
-blackettslip-copy-2012-wl-1925540ca3-virgin-islands2012.html.
99. See Blackett, 481 Fed.App’x at 742.
100. See id.
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Finally, recorded recollections are similar to Rule
801(d)(1)(A) prior inconsistent statements and most Rule
801(d)(1)(C) statements of identification in that they are rec101
orded and thus can be repeated verbatim at trial. Therefore,
unlike the case with other hearsay statements, there is no concern with a recorded recollection that what the jury hears is
102
different from what the defendant said/wrote.
2. Why Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) Makes Sense as an
Extension of Rule 803(5)
As noted, in the Blackett case, the court allowed the prose103
cution to admit text messages pursuant to Rule 803(5). This
decision was not anomalous. Instead, several courts have allowed parties to admit text messages pursuant to the recorded
recollection exception. For example, in Simmons v. Commonwealth, the victim of various sexual offenses allegedly committed by the defendant was able to read handwritten copies of
text messages concerning the crimes under Kentucky’s version
104
of Rule 803(5). In State v. Roseberry, the prosecution proved
that a defendant was guilty of breaking and entering by having
the victim, under Ohio’s version of Rule 803(5), read handwritten transcriptions of text messages in which the defendant dis105
cussed the crime. And, in State v. Loye, the victim was allowed to testify concerning text messages pursuant to
Minnesota’s version of Rule 803(5) to establish that she was the
106
victim of domestic assault. Other courts, meanwhile, have al107
lowed for the introduction of e-mails pursuant to Rule 803(5).
101. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1539 (11th Cir. 1992)
(“The court permitted Jacoby to impeach Merrill by reading verbatim the
transcript of Merrill's grand jury testimony. Jacoby thus was able to develop
fully before the jury the alleged inconsistencies between the witness’ trial and
grand jury testimony.”).
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. See Simmons v. Commonwealth, No. 2012–SC–000064–MR, 2013 WL
674721, at *2 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2013) (“The trial court did, however, allow E.J to
read from her diary as during trial, she testified that she could not recall exactly what Appellant had said to her during the message exchange.”).
105. See State v. Roseberry, 967 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he
trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Adams to read the series of
text messages out loud pursuant to Evid.R. 803(5) . . . .”).
106. See State v. Loye, No. A08-1101, 2009 WL 1684425, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 16, 2009).
107. See S.E.C. v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 870, 878 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“This
email at least is admissible as past recollection recorded and/or under the residual exception.”); Weatherly v. Alabama State University, No. 2:10CV192–
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Therefore, many of the types of eHearsay that would be
admissible under Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D)
are already admissible under Rule 803(5). That said, there are
two important limitations in Rule 803(5) that exclude certain
eHearsay that Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule would now accommodate.
The first limitation in Rule 803(5) is that the recorded recollection exception applies only if the declarant testifies that he
cannot testify fully and accurately about an event due to im108
paired memory.
So, assume that William sees Dan shoot
Vince and, two days later, sends his friend, Fred, a text message that says, “OMG! Dan killed Vince two days ago.” If, at
Dan’s murder trial, William testifies that he has total recall of
the shooting, his text message would be inadmissible under
Rule 803(5).
According to the Advisory Committee’s Note, the reason for
the requirement of impaired memory is that “[t]he absence of
the requirement . . . would encourage the use of statements
carefully prepared for purposes of litigation under the supervi109
sion of attorneys, investigators, or claim adjusters.” For instance, it is easy to see Dan’s murder case being assigned to a
detective, with the detective asking William to make a statement days after the shooting and asking him leading questions
that make it seem like William was certain that it was Dan
who killed Vince. If Rule 803(5) did not require William to
claim impaired memory on the witness stand, the prosecution
could always corroborate William’s testimony with his police
statement, which would hardly seem fair to Dan. Instead, Rule
803(5) is reserved for cases in which a witness such as William
WHA, 2012 WL 274754, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2012) (“If the Plaintiffs seek
to admit the substance of the email pursuant to Rule 803(5), as noted above,
that attempt will be subject to objection by the Defendant at trial.”); Broadus
v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-1201, 2009 WL 1402025, at *5 (E.D. La. May 14,
2009) (finding that an e-mail would be admissible as a recorded recollection if
a witness could not recall the events in the e-mail); Kitterman v. Michigan
Educational Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1459523, No. 247428, at *4
(Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (assuming without deciding that e-mails were
admissible under Michigan Rule of Evidence 803(5)).
108. FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A). See, e.g., Means v. Cullen, 297 F. Supp. 2d
1148, 1151 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (“The content of defendant’s email does not qualify as an admission by a party opponent because it is not offered against defendant, see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A), and it does not qualify as a recorded
recollection because defendant has not shown that she cannot recall making
the statement.”).
109. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.

2013]

NO EXPLANATION REQUIRED?

57

is forgetful and his recorded recollection is thus necessary to
get a full accounting of what happened.
Conversely, assume again that, two days after the shooting, William sends his friend, Fred, a text message that says,
“OMG! Dan killed Vince two days ago.” This text message,
composed outside the shadow of litigation, seems fundamentally different from the police statement in the other example. It
also is exactly the type of recorded communication covered by
Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule because it is not “a statement
made in contemplation of litigation or to a person who is inves110
tigating, litigating, or settling a potential or existing claim.”
Therefore, Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) fills a gap left by Rule
803(5): it allows for the admission of eHearsay composed outside the shadow of litigation without the requirement of impaired memory by the declarant.
The second limitation in Rule 803(5) is that it applies only
if the declarant testifies that the recorded recollection “accu111
rately reflects the witness’s knowledge.” Returning to the example above involving the police statement, if William testifies
at trial that he remembers some but not all details of the fatal
shooting, the prosecution could introduce William’s police
statement as a recorded recollection as long as William testifies
112
that the statement accurately reflects what he saw. Assume,
however, that William surprisingly testifies that he saw Carl,
and not Dan, fatally shoot Vince. At this point, the prosecution
would want to introduce William’s police statement to contradict what William said on the witness stand.
The prosecution, however, would have a fundamental problem. Presumably, William, who is now claiming that it was
Carl who shot Vince, would not testify that his police statement
accurately reflected what he saw. In that case, the police
113
statement would not be admissible as a recorded recollection.
It would be admissible to impeach William pursuant to Rule
110. Bellin, supra note 59, at 36.
111. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
112. See id.
113. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(“Taylor never guaranteed that his memory was correctly transcribed or that
the factual assertions contained in the statement were true.”); State v. Hollingsworth, 337 S.E.2d 674, 676–77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (“Since she testified
that when she wrote the letter, it did not correctly reflect her knowledge of the
events and she did not know facts that she had forgotten by the time of the
trial, the trial court should not have admitted the letter into evidence as a recorded recollection.”).
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114

613, but it would not be admissible to prove the truth of the
matter asserted pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because it was
115
not given under oath. Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule thus
fills another gap that currently exists in Rule 803(5): it allows
for the admission of a recorded communication even if the witness does not testify that the communication “accurately re116
flects the witness’s knowledge.”
The question, of course, is whether either of these gaps
should be filled. The answer seems to be a clear “yes.” The only
reason that Rule 803(5) requires an impaired memory is to prevent the admission of statements carefully prepared with an
117
eye toward litigation. Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) avoids this
problem by requiring that eHearsay not be “made in contem118
plation of litigation.”
Meanwhile, prior inconsistent statements covered by Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) are somewhat less reliable than prior
inconsistent statements covered by Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because
they are not given under oath. But, as noted, statements covered by Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) are “not made in contemplation of litigation,” while statements covered by Rule
801(d)(1)(A) are either given in contemplation of litigation (e.g.,
affidavits) or given as part of the litigation process (e.g., deposi119
tions). Therefore, even if a declarant disavows a prior tweet,
text message, or e-mail, that recorded communication seemingly possesses reliability commensurate with the reliability of a
prior inconsistent statement given under oath.
II. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND THE PROBLEM WITH
PROPOSED RULE 804(B)(5)
In addition to the proposed eHearsay exclusion that Professor Bellin locates in Rule 801(d)(1), he creates a proposed
eHearsay exception to be placed in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b). That Rule, Proposed Rule 804(a)(5), would create the
following hearsay exception in the case of an “unavailable” declarant:
Recorded Statement of Recent Perception. A recorded communication
that describes or explains an event or condition recently perceived by
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See FED. R. EVID. 613.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(C).
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
Bellin, supra note 59, at 36.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
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the declarant, but not including: (A) a statement made in contemplation of litigation, or to a person who is investigating, litigating, or set120
tling a potential or existing claim; or (B) an anonymous statement.

This Rule would thus apply if the declarant does not appear on the witness stand because the proponent could not lo121
122
cate him or the declarant passed away before trial. It would
123
also apply if the declarant validly invoked a privilege or simp124
ly refused to testify despite being held in contempt of court.
The question, then, is whether the declarant’s testimony should
be a necessary element for the admission of eHearsay or
whether the declarant’s unavailability is sufficient for its introduction.
A. THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION AND EQUIVALENT
CIRCUMSTANTIAL GUARANTEES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
Federal Rule of Evidence 807 creates a residual hearsay
exception for a hearsay statement that is “not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804” but that, inter
alia, “has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi125
ness.” Under the logic of Rule 807, then, it would make sense
120. Bellin , supra note 59, at 36.
121. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). Rule 804(a)(5) provides that a declarant is
“unavailable” if the declarant:
is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has
not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure: (A)
the declarant’s attendance, in the case of a hearsay exception under
Rule 804(b)(1) or (6); or (B) the declarant’s attendance or testimony,
in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(2), (3), or (4).
122. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4). Rule 804(a)(4) provides that a declarant is
“unavailable” if the declarant “cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental
illness . . . .”
123. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1). Rule 804(a)(1) provides that a declarant is
“unavailable” if the declarant “is exempted from testifying about the subject
matter of the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege
applies . . . .”
124. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2). Rule 804(a)(2) provides that a declarant is
“unavailable” if the declarant “refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so . . . .”
125. FED. R. EVID. 807. In its entirety, Rule 807(a) states:
Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the
statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that
the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice.
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to create a new hearsay rule only if the new rule covered
statements containing circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those in a comparable existing hearsay
126
exception. Indeed, in the absence of an eHearsay exception,
litigants frequently have tried to admit recorded communications under Rule 807, with courts deciding the validity of such
attempts by considering comparable existing hearsay exceptions.
For instance, in Stamm v. New York City Transit Authority, the plaintiff brought an action pursuant to the Americans
with Disabilities Act and related laws, claiming that the New
York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Manhattan and
Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority “failed to ensure
that their vehicles and facilities are accessible to her and other
127
persons with disabilities who utilize service animals.” Thereafter, the plaintiff brought an ADA retaliation claim against
the NYCTA, asserting that it refused to permit her access to an
128
empty articulated bus in response to her initial lawsuit.
In response the NYCTA sought to admit into evidence an email that employee Michael Levy sent on July 19, 2004 denying
129
the plaintiff access to an articulated bus. This e-mail would
have helped the NYCTA’s case because the plaintiff did not
bring her lawsuit until January 23, 2008, and there is a threeyear statute of limitations on retaliation claims under the
130
ADA.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York found that the e-mail was not admissible under the
business records exception to the rule against hearsay (Rule
803(6)) because the NYCTA did not “provid[e] sufficient evidence to establish that these e-mails were records ‘kept in the
course of regularly conducted activity’ and made as part of ‘the
131
regular practice of that activity.’” That said, the court noted
that Levy followed up the e-mail by informing his colleagues of

126. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878 (N.D. Cal 2012)
(finding that, even if an e-mail was not admissible under the recorded recollection exception, it could still be admissible under the residual exception because it contained equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness).
127. Stamm v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–2163, 2013 WL 244793, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013).
128. Id. at *8.
129. Id. at *9.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *11 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B) and (C)).
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132

the denial. Therefore, the court found that the e-mail was
admissible under Rule 807, concluding that because “Levy was
attempting to be precise and knew his co-workers would rely on
his statements, there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those underlying the business records
133
exception.” Conversely, in Mercer v. Csiky, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that a
business e-mail did not qualify for admission under Rule 807
because it did not contain circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those of a business record under Rule
134
803(6).
As Professor Bellin notes, Rule 801(d)(1)(D) is modeled after the “Statement of Recent Perception” hearsay exception
that was rejected by Congress in 1973, which would have allowed for the admission of:
[a] statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged
in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the
declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollec135
tion was clear.

In effect, this rejected hearsay exception would have extended the timeline created by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1),
which provides a hearsay exception for “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immedi136
ately after the declarant perceived it.” This “present sense
impression” exception covers statements made by a declarant
within seconds or minutes after perceiving an event or condi137
tion; the proposed Statement of Recent Perception exception
132. Id. at *10. Specifically, Levy informed his colleagues that: “I left a
message for Ms. Stamm at 9:30 AM today 7–19–04, informing her that the
Department of Buses could not provide the training she requested. I referred
her to DOB Customer Relations if she had further questions.” Id.
133. Id.
134. Mercer v. Csiky, No. 08–11443–BC, 2010 WL 3565811, at *5–6. (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 13, 2010). The plaintiffs had claimed that the e-mail was “sufficiently trustworthy because, if it [were] intentionally false, it would [have]
subject[ed] [the writer] to legal action under state law (e.g., for slander).” Id. at
*6.
135. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377–78 (1969).
136. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
137. See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot
Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 919–20 (2001) (“While twentythree minutes appears to be the longest ‘slight lapse’ allowed, other decisions
have approved the admission of present sense impressions uttered a few se-
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and Professor Bellin’s proposed eHearsay exclusion would cover
statements made up to eight days after perceiving an event or
138
condition.
In determining whether Proposed Rule 804(b)(5) passes
muster, the question thus becomes whether eHearsay by an
unavailable declarant, on the one hand, and a classic present
sense impression by an unavailable declarant, on the other,
possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. In making this determination, consider the following two
hypotheticals. In the first hypothetical, William sees Dan shoot
Vince and immediately turns to Fred and says, “Oh my god!
Brian’s brother Dan totally killed Vince! You don’t mess with
those guys. I feel sick.” In the second hypothetical, the day after
the shooting, William tweets the following message on his
Twitter account: “WTG! Brian’s brother Dan totally KILLED
Vince in the parking lot behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern yesterday!
You don’t mess with those guys. #SICK”
If William passes away before Dan’s trial for murdering
Vince, the prosecution would likely try to (1) have Fred testify
concerning William’s statement in the first hypothetical, and
(2) introduce William’s tweet in the second hypothetical. Professor Bellin identifies the one reason to prefer the tweet to
Fred’s testimony: with nonrecorded hearsay such as William’s
present sense impression, “[t]he testifying witness may mishear, misremember, miscommunicate or (worst of all) manufac139
ture the out-of-court speaker’s statement.” Conversely, the
tweet is recorded, and, if preserved, can be presented to the jury in its original form. In this regard, the tweet could be said to
have a greater circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness
than the classic present sense impression.
conds, one minute, three to five minutes, five minutes, seven minutes, five to
ten minutes, ten minutes, fourteen and one-half minutes, and at least eighteen minutes after the event.”) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court of
New Jersey noted in State ex rel. J.A., 949 A.2d 790, 798 (N.J. 2008):
When considering whether a statement is a present sense impression, it is not hairsplitting to recognize a distinction between a matter
of seconds, however many they may be, and an interval of as much as
ten minutes separating a recollection from the observation. For purposes of a present sense impression, a declarant's statement that “the
blue sports car is going through the red light” or that “the blue sports
car just went through the red light” (seconds ago) is different from a
declarant's statement that “the blue sports car went through the red
light ten minutes ago.”
138. Bellin, supra note 59, at 143 n.137.
139. Id. at 38.
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Continuing this analysis, however, there are four problems
whenever a declarant makes a hearsay statement. That statement is always somewhat unreliable because of possible deficits
140
in “perception, memory, narration, and sincerity.” As noted,
hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible both because such
evidence is unreliable and because the jury has an inability to
141
assess that unreliability at trial. On the other hand, hearsay
that qualifies for admission under a Rule 803 or 804 exception
is admissible because it contains circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness that quell concerns about one or more of the
possible deficits. The following four subsections will compare
the classic present sense impression from the first hypothetical
with the eHearsay in the second hypothetical to see how each
142
fares in this regard.
1. Memory
A present sense impression is thought to be reliable primarily because there is little to no problem with the declarant’s
memory when he speaks. Under Rule 803(1), a present sense
impression must be “made while or immediately after the de143
clarant perceived” an event or condition. Therefore, in the
first hypothetical, William would be telling Fred that Dan
killed Vince while watching Dan kill Vince or, at most, a few
144
minutes later. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “[t]he reason
present sense impressions are considered inherently reliable is
because statements contemporaneously describing an event are
unlikely to reflect memory loss or provide an opportunity to
145
lie.”
Professor Bellin’s proposed eHearsay exception, however,
would allow for the admission of statements made up to eight
140. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2249 (2012).
141. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Lasnick v. Morgan, No. 3:10–cv–345, 2011 WL 6300159, at *2
(D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2011) (“In assessing the trustworthiness of a statement for
purposes of Rule 807, a court should be mindful of the ‘four classes of risk peculiar to [hearsay] evidence: those of (1) insincerity, (2) faulty perception, (3)
faulty memory, and (4) faulty narration.’”) (quoting Schering Corp. v. Pfizer
Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 232 (2d Cir. 1999)).
143. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
145. United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012); see
also United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Such statements are considered to be trustworthy because the contemporaneity of the
event and its description limits the possibility for intentional deception or failure of memory.”).

64

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[98:34
146

days after a declarant perceives an event or condition. Currently, “courts consistently require substantial contemporanei147
ty”
between event/condition and statement under Rule
803(1); Professor Bellin’s new exception would cross this line in
the sand by “cover[ing] a declarant’s relatively recent memo148
ries.” As noted, such statements about older events and conditions are not admissible under Rule 803(1), and Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(3), which contains the “state of mind” hearsay
exception, specifically excludes from its auspices “a statement
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or be149
lieved.”
The reason for this line-drawing is obvious: “[s]hort-term
150
memory degrades within minutes or hours.” Therefore, when
more than a few minutes have passed after a declarant perceives an event or condition, his “memories decline[] precipitously” as his short-term memory begins to transfer, often im151
perfectly, into his long-term memory. Therefore, a statement
admitted under Proposed Rule 804(b)(5) is more likely to be
based on a faulty memory than is a statement admitted under
Rule 803(1).

146. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
147. United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2009).
148. United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 2004) (declining
to extend the present-sense-impression exception to “relatively recent memories”).
149. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) provides an exception to the rule
against hearsay for:
A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as
motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition
(such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.
According to the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803:
The exclusion of “statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed” is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of
the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of
mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of
mind.
150. Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science,
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 958 (1994).
151. Jascha Hoffman, Suspect Memories, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005, at
42, 43; see also Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited
Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 179 n.70 (1997)
(“Memory of five minutes ago is linked to long-term memory rather than shortterm memory . . . .”).
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2. Sincerity
The second main reason why present sense impressions are
admissible is tied to the first. As noted, the Ninth Circuit has
concluded that present sense impressions made contemporaneously with events/conditions are “inherently reliable . . . because statements contemporaneously describing an event are
unlikely to reflect memory loss or provide an opportunity to
152
lie.” The general principle is that the shorter the period of
time between event/condition and statement, the more trustworthy the statement because the declarant has little opportunity to fabricate a story about the event/condition; “[t]he
longer the time, the less trustworthy, since there is more time
153
and opportunity to fabricate.” Under this test, there would be
reason to believe that eHearsay composed hours or days after
an event or condition could be less sincere than a present sense
impression made during or minutes after that event or condition.
Apart from the timing issue, there are other reasons to believe that eHearsay might be less sincere than a classic present
sense impression. Experts in communication have concluded
that “people are more likely to lie online especially in social
networking sites like Facebook, MySpace and . . . on the dating
154
or ‘search soul mates’ types of websites.”
Specifically,
“[o]nline communication is a fast process as compared to the
authentic ways of communication that we have been accus155
tomed since childhood,” increasing the likelihood of lies.
Moreover, research has revealed that people are better at
lying in electronic communications than in face-to-face commu156
nications. According to forensic psychologist Michael Woodworth:
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. People v. Thomas, 730 N.E.2d 618, 625 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated
by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See also People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 915 (Mich. 1988) (Brickey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The statement is likely to be reliable because it is made before the declarant has an opportunity to fabricate, embellish, or forget what is
being described.”).
154. Ruben Supramanyam, More Likely to Lie on Social Network,
AVOIDFACEBOOK (March 7, 2011, 6:15 PM), http://www.avoidfacebook.com/
2011/03/07/more-likely-to-lie-on-social-network/.
155. Id.
156. Raina Ducklow & Bud Mortenson, What Lies Behind the Online
Words?, 55 U.B.C. REPORTS, April 2, 2009, http://www.publicaffairs.ubc.ca/
ubcreports/2009/09apr02/behind.html.
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When people are interacting face to face, there is something called
the ‘motivational impairment effect,’ where your body will give off
some cues as you become more nervous and there’s more at stake
with your lie . . . . In a computer-mediated environment, the exact opposite occurs. . . .
....
When telling a lie face-to-face, the higher the stakes of your deception, the more cues you may give out that you’re lying. So, what isn’t
in a text message may have advantages for a would-be deceiver: text
doesn’t transmit non-verbal cues such as vocal properties, physical
157
gestures, and facial expressions.

Finally, even if a declarant is not consciously lying in a
tweet, text message, or e-mail, the declarant may not be conveying what he means to convey. Research has shown “that
people are better at communicating and interpreting tone in
158
vocal messages than in text-based ones.” Recall again the
prior tweet from William in the second hypothetical: “WTG!
Brian’s brother Dan totally KILLED Vince in the parking lot
behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern yesterday! You don’t mess with
those guys. #SICK.” Was the declarant being serious and sincere when he composed this tweet? Was this tweet a joke about
an event that never actually happened? Was the tweet an exaggeration? The research tends to show that William will have
more difficulty conveying, and people reading the tweet (including jurors) will have more difficulty interpreting, William’s tone
than if William had told Fred that he saw Dan shoot Vince—
the classic present sense impression.
All of the above research could call into question the admissibility of any eHearsay. Recall, though, that Proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(D) requires a declarant such as William to testify and
subject himself to cross-examination for his recorded communi159
cation to be admitted. Was the tweet sincere, a joke, or an exaggeration? By taking the oath, subjecting himself to crossexamination, and being fully on display for the jury, a declarant such as William allows the jury to draw its own conclusions
160
about the sincerity of the tweet. Conversely, under Proposed
Rule 804(b)(5), all the jury has is the cold, antiseptic tweet,
without any opportunity to judge whether William did a poor
job of conveying tone in the tweet or whether the tweet was an
outright lie.
157. Id.
158. Lea Winerman, E-mails and Egos, 37 MONITOR, Feb. 2006, http://www
.apa.org/monitor/feb06/egos.aspx.
159. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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3. Narration
Any hearsay statement contains the inherent possibility
that it contains errors in narration, i.e. “the risk that the de161
clarant may misspeak or be misunderstood.” Obviously, there
is some overlap here with the discussion in the previous section
about people being better at communicating and interpreting
162
tone in vocal messages than in text-based ones. In this section, however, the focus will solely be on ambiguous and incorrect statements of fact in communications.
Again, in the first hypothetical, William sees Dan shoot
Vince and immediately turns to Fred and says, “Oh my god!
Brian’s brother Dan totally killed Vince! You don’t mess with
those guys. I feel sick.” In the second hypothetical, the day after
the shooting, William tweets the following message on his
Twitter account: “WTG! Brian’s brother Dan totally KILLED
Vince in the parking lot behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern yesterday!
You don’t mess with those guys. #SICK”
If William’s tweet is admitted at trial without William testifying, the jury could easily have several problems in analyzing the tweet. Dan’s defense might be that he has another
brother named Carl and that William must have meant to say
Carl and not Dan because Dan never attacked Vince. Alternately, Dan could claim that when William tweeted that Dan “totally KILLED Vince,” he was talking about a verbal argument
that Dan won rather than a physical attack. Or, Dan could
claim that by “totally KILLED,” William meant that Dan won a
fight with Vince but did not come close to killing him.
Assume that Vince died in the parking lot of a Burger
King, with that parking lot being behind the parking lot for
O’Sullivan’s Tavern and across the street. When William referred to “the parking lot behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern,” was he
referring to the parking lot for O’Sullivan’s Tavern or the Burger King parking lot? And what about William’s statement that
“[y]ou don’t mess with those guys”? Does this mean that Vince
was the first aggressor? Does William mean that Vince was
merely insulting or taunting Dan? Or was William merely assuming that Vince must have done something to anger Dan despite possessing no actual knowledge of a provoking act? And
161. Peter Nicolas, But What if the Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to
Confront Hidden Declarants Found in Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2010).
162. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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who are “those guys”? Is William referring to Dan and his
brother Brian or some other guys?
Finally, what is meant by #SICK? People use the #/hashtag
to categorize tweets “and help them show more easily in Twit163
ter Search.” But what did William mean when he tweeted
#SICK? Was he literally sick, and if so, was he sick at the time
that he observed the attack, if it was even an actual attack? If
so, was the sickness one that might hinder his perception or
memory of the attack? Or, by tweeting #SICK, was William
merely signifying that Dan’s act of violence made him feel upset and disturbed?
If William is unavailable to testify, as is required by Proposed Rule 804(b)(5), the jury may never get a good answer to
any of these questions. Yes, William could follow up this tweet
with other, clarifying tweets on his own. And yes, other Twitter
users could reply to William’s tweet, prompting him to tweet
follow-up tweets. There is, however, no guarantee of such clarification.
Comparing this hypothetical to the first hypothetical, it is
easy to see why the chance of confusion or error is much lower
with a classic present sense impression. Again, in that hypothetical, William sees Dan shoot Vince and immediately turns
to Fred and makes his statement. Fred then later takes the
witness stand and repeats William’s statement to the jury.
Was William literally sick when he made the statement?
Fred can testify about whether William appeared to be sick.
What did William mean by, “You don’t mess with those guys”?
Fred also observed the encounter and can testify as to whether
and to what extent Vince was provoking Dan. Fred can also
clarify the exact location of the encounter because he was there.
Because he was present, Fred can also clarify whether the
words “totally killed” referred to a physical altercation and, if
so, whether it involved lethal or nonlethal force. Was it Dan or
his brother Carl who killed Vince? Fred, as another observer,
can state on the witness stand that William likely misspoke or
spoke accurately. Moreover, because Fred is present when William makes the statement, he can easily ask William for clarification or correction of his statement if he thinks that William
misspoke.

163. See Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://
support.twitter.com/entries/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (last visited
Nov. 2, 2013).
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All of these considerations lead to the conclusion that possible errors in narration pose a greater problem when eHearsay
is admitted under Proposed Rule 804(b)(5) than when a classic
present sense impression is admitted under Rule 803(1). Moreover, there are problems with narration inherent in many of
the media used for electronic communications. A person using
164
Twitter can use only 140 characters in a tweet, and a person
165
sending a text message is generally limited to 160 characters.
The tweet in the second hypothetical had 140 characters, and it
is easy to see how the character limit makes it difficult for a
person to include all “material information to ensure the com166
munication is complete and accurate.”
One way that people try to cram an entire message into a
tweet or text message is by using acronyms. For example, in
the second hypothetical, William used the acronym, “WTG!”
The problem is that many acronyms have multiple meanings,
which can create confusion. According to the Urban Dictionary,
“WTG” can mean “Way to Go,” which would seem to imply that
167
William approved of Dan’s actions. But the Urban Dictionary
also states that “WTG” can mean “Wow That’s Great,” but with
168
that phrase often being used sarcastically. So, was William
making the sarcastic observation that what happened was not
great, or was he using the term literally, again to show approval? Finally, the Urban Dictionary also states that “WTG” can
169
also mean “What the Ghetto.” So, was William commenting
that the fight between Dan and Vince was only something that
you see in the ghetto? It is easy to see William using “WTG” in
any of these three or other ways, and, without his testimony, it
is impossible to know exactly what he meant.
The same concerns, of course, apply when a person sending
a text or tweet uses an abbreviation to save space, with that
abbreviation possibly meaning several things. For example, assume that the tweet in the second hypothetical did not say that
164. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012)
(explaining how Twitter works).
165. Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 999,
1001 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (explaining how SMS text messaging works).
166. Alexis Cairo & Randy L. Dryer, Emerging Legal and Ethical Issues in
the Brave New World of Social Media and Corporate Transparency, 56 Rocky
Mountain Mineral Inst. 3-1 (2010).
167. See WTG, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define
.php?term=wtg (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
168. See id.
169. See id.
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Dan was Brian’s brother but that (1) the tweet did mention
Brian; and (2) the tweet contained the sentence “What a bther!”
In this tweet, the sentence “What a bthr!” could easily mean
“What a brother!” or “What a bother!,” with each word creating
different meanings.
Finally, narration problems are also inherent in text messages and some other electronic media due to cramped key170
boards and predictive software like AutoCorrect. As Professor
Bellin has noted elsewhere:
Typists working on cramped keypads inevitably mistype important
words, simplify complex events, and omit critical details. Software innovations designed to counteract these limitations correct perceived
spelling mistakes in real time and even attempt to predict the typist’s
171
words, sometimes with limited success.

For instance, assume in the second hypothetical that William sent a text message stating that “Dan killed Vince.” If
Dan’s defense is that a man named Mike Dahn killed Vince, is
it possible that, while William was composing his text, his texting software autocorrected Dahn to Dan? Or, assume that the
prosecution seeks to use a text message sent by William stating
that “Dahn killed Vince” to prove that Dan killed Vince. The
question would then be whether William intentionally wrote
“Dahn” or whether William accidentally pressed the “h” key,
just above the “n” key, in between touching the “a” and “n” keys
while trying to type “Dan.” If William testifies, he can explain
what he meant; if William is absent, as is required by Proposed
Rule 804(b)(5), the jurors will get no such explanation. Instead,
the jurors will be like college students in a study cited by Professor Bellin in a previous article that:
describe[ed] the increasing popularity of “predictive texting software,”
and contrast[ed] the widespread errors made by college students
asked to interpret text messages from other students with the relative
absence of interpretive errors when the texters were forced to write
out the same messages without abbreviations and texting short172
hand.

4. Perception
Finally, any hearsay statement carries an inherent risk of
reflecting errors in perception, i.e., “the risk that the declarant
may have inaccurately perceived the events at issue in her
170. Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present
Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 364–65 (2012).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 365 n.122.
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173

statement.” In either of the two hypotheticals, maybe William
thought that Dan had killed Vince despite the fact that Vince
was still alive after their encounter. Maybe William thought
that the encounter took place in the parking lot behind
O’Sullivan’s Tavern when it actually took place in the parking
lot behind O’Malley’s Tavern. Or maybe William thought that
he saw Dan kill Vince when it was in fact Dan’s brother Carl,
who bears a striking resemblance to Dan.
If William turns to Fred during the killing or immediately
thereafter and makes his statement, the jury at least has some
tools to judge whether William made a perception error. How
far away was William from Dan and Vince? Did William arrive
after the fight had started, or was he there the whole time?
Was William distracted, or was his full attention focused on the
encounter? Fred might not be able to answer all of these and
similar questions, but he can at least give some indication of
William’s vantage point and whether the surrounding circumstances heightened or lessened the chance that William misperceived the encounter.
Conversely, consider again the second hypothetical in
which William tweets that Dan killed Vince the day before.
Under Proposed Rule 804(b)(5), William is, by definition, “unavailable,” and thus cannot explain his vantage point. In some
cases, there might be another witness such as Fred who was at
the encounter and who can testify concerning what William
likely saw. In many other cases, however, the jury will be left to
speculate about just how much William saw and did not see,
and thus about the likelihood that his recorded communication
was the result of a perception error.
CONCLUSION
Jeffrey Bellin’s article, eHearsay, makes an extraordinarily
important contribution to the scant scholarship on the intersection between electronic evidence and the rules of evidence.
Crafted in the 1970s out of common law rules that are centuries older, the Federal Rules of Evidence were born out of a
world in which the preeminent form of communication occurred
face-to-face. Courts understandably have struggled in attempting to retrofit these analog rules to a digital world, and Professor Bellin’s article wisely resurrects the rejected Statement of
Recent Perception exception to create a hearsay exclusion cov173. Nicolas, supra note 161, at 1153.
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ering recorded communications made outside the shadow of litigation when the declarant can take the witness stand and explain what he wrote. Conversely, without the declarant taking
the witness stand to explain tone, vantage point, and ambiguities, a recorded communication loses much of its reliability.
Therefore, Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(B), which requires the declarant to testify, should be adopted, but Proposed Rule
804(b)(5), which requires the declarant’s unavailability, should
not.

